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NO-KNOCK AND NONSENSE, AN ALLEGED
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMt
MicHAEL R. SONNENREICH*
STANLxY EBNER**
On July 16, 1969, the Nixon Administration sent to the Congress
a major revision of the existing federal narcotic and dangerous drug
laws entitled the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.' Hearings
have been held in the Senate and much debate has ensued. In addition
to discussions concerning penalties, industry regulation and research,
one item has attracted a great deal of attention, indeed, far more than
anyone involved with the proposal originally thought. From the first,
"no-knock" was the lead for newspaper articles concerning the bill.2
It became immediately apparent that there existed a great deal of
misinformation about this no-knock authority and its impact upon the
average citizen. Visions of kicked-in doors, sinister police invading resi-
dences in the dark of night, and other manifestations of the "police
state" sprang to mind. In addition to this popular misconception, the
only formal disagreement to come out of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, which reported favorably on the Controlled Dangerous Sub-
stances Act, concerned no-knock and questioned its constitutionality.
Indeed, this controversy eventually led to a revision of the original
no-knock provision before the proposed Act was passed by the Senate.
The House has not yet acted on the bill.
This article has been written to place the issue in proper perspec-
tive. The historical origins of no-knock in the common law will be
traced, and the relevant state statutes and decisions will be analyzed.
The federal posture, legislation and case law, will also be examined.
Finally, the article will refocus upon the proposed Controlled Dan-
gerous Substances Act and its no-knock provision, section 702(b). It is
the opinion of the authors that this section is, in fact, a realistic com-
promise between those who favor the common-law exception in its
t The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs specifically, nor of the
Department of Justice generally. The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable as-
sistance of Roy E. Kinsey and Robert G. Pinco.
8 Deputy Chief Counsel, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, United States
Department of Justice. BA., University of Wisconsin, 1960; LL.B., Harvard University,
1963.
** Legislative Attorney, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, United States De-
partment of Justice. B.A., Yale University, 1955; LL.B., Yale University, 1958.
1 S.3246, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970).
2 See, e.g., Stokes, Nixon's Drug Bill, TmE NATIoN, Sept. 22, 1969, at 271.
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totality and those who insist that such authority is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.
I. HisToiucAL DEVELOPMENT OF "THE KNocK"
COMMON LAW
England
A man's home, mortgaged though it may be, has long been consid-
ered under Anglo-American tradition to be his castle. Indeed, this
principle is embodied in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 3
Yet, long before the framers of that document set quill to ink, the
English judiciary had consistently been compelled to consider the issue
of the King's right of entry into private dwellings. The difficulties
inherently involved in this question can be illustrated by the fact that
the ancient principle which proclaims that "Every man's house is his
castle" is matched in age by the maxim that "The King's keys unlock
all doors."4 Actually, these principles relate to different processes, the
former applying to civil actions, and the latter to those of a criminal
nature. Thus, the fifteenth century statement of the rule indicated that
invasion of the home was justified in cases involving a felony; the ap-
prehension of the felon was in the interest of both the common weal
and the King. On the other hand, in cases involving debt or trespass,
the interest of a private party would not justify the invasion of a dwell-.
ing to apprehend the wrongdoer.5
The most familiar statement of the common-law rule is contained
in Semayne's Case6:
In all cases when the King is [a] party, the sheriff (if the doors be
not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to
do other execution of the [King's] process, if otherwise he cannot
enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his
coming, and to make request to open [the] doors ....
Since the opinion was actually concerned with a writ issued in a civil
3 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
US. CONSr. amend. IV.
4See BRooM's LEGAL MAXIMs 281, 432 (10th ed. 1929).
5Y. B. Pasch., 13 Edw. 4, f.9a (1455).
6 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ex. 1603). The use of the word "ought" in the last sentence of
the dictum should be noted as it relates to a central issue within the framework of this
article.
SlId. at 195.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
case, it was only by way of dicta that "the knock," or announcement of
purpose, was enunciated as a specific obligation in connection with
authorized entry into private dwellings.
During this period in English history, authorities differed as to the
circumstances under which a breaking of doors would be permissible.
For example, Coke expressed the view in his Fourth Institutes that a
warrant to break open a house in search for a felon, issued upon suspi-
cion, contravened both the Magna Carta and existing case law.8 How-
ever, the indictment of the suspected party would empower the sheriff,
by virtue of the warrant, to forcibly enter the house." On the other
hand, Hale apparently believed that, even in the absence of a warrant,
a constable possessed sufficient power to break open a door whenever a
felony had actually been committed. In addition, he indicated that
when a suspected felon took flight and entered a house, a warrantless
constable could break in if "the door will not be opened upon demand
of the constable and notification of his business."' 0
While the debate continued and the common-law standards
evolved," it is apparent that houses were in fact being entered on a
sufficiently indiscriminate basis to contribute to a general feeling of un-
certainty and discontent. 12 Yet, it is clear that during this period, discus-
sion of the governmental right to break and enter private dwellings
centered not upon the necessity of prior warning or announcement of
purpose, but rather, upon the justification for the breaking or, in other
words, the "reasonableness" of the forced entry. Judges and legal schol-
ars of that era were concerned with such relevant questions as: Was
there a warrant? Was there hot pursuit? Was the commission of a felony
observed? Was there an immediate threat of violence or danger to the
law enforcement official? And finally, was there a previous notice of
authority and purpose?13
Within the context of the above circumstances, the phraseology
used in Semayne's Case becomes more significant as an expression of
seventeenth century legal philosophy in England. The sheriff "ought"
to signify why he is about to execute the King's process before he
breaks and enters. But the broadest examination of English law and
8 E. COKE, THE FouRm PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERN-
ING JURISDICTIONS OF CouRT 177 (6th ed. 1681).
9 Id.
10 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 90-92 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
11 See W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 598 (3d ed. 1934).
12 Similarly, it was the subsequent employment of the so-called "writs of assistance"
during the colonial era which pointed to a parting of the ways between England and her
colonies.
1s See Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-62 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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precedent discloses no evidence that such a suggestion was ever, in fact,
a requirement which would render the subsequent entry legal. For too
long this case has been read out of context; to ignore the precatory
wording is to further confuse the problem.
United States
In the United States, the common-law rule of Semayne's Case
was generally followed in early decisions. Thus, in Oystead v. Shed,14
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphasized the right of a
citizen to be free from forcible entry into his home for civil arrest pur-
poses, although there is some question as to whether this pronounce-
ment was necessary to the decision. It was recognized, however, that
force could be utilized when the entry was effected to seize specific
goods (as under writs of attachment).15 Similarly, it was recognized as
early as 1822 that, if notice was in fact a general requirement, under
certain circumstances that requirement would be rendered unneces-
sary. One such instance was clearly enunciated by a Connecticut court
in Read v. Case,16 which held that imminent danger to life eliminated
the need to provide notice. Indeed, a later Kentucky case, Hawkins v.
Commonwealth,17 attempted to extend this rule, indicating that no
notice whatsoever was required in criminal cases, since the "offender"
would then be presented with an opportunity to avoid the process of
the law. The continuing uncertainty regarding the notice or announce-
ment aspect in criminal cases was exemplified in Commonwealth v.
Reynolds,'8 which attempted to summarize the existing law by stating
that an officer could always break and enter after announcement of
purpose and refusal, but that some courts had refused to impose such
an obligation upon law enforcement authorities where the crime con-
stituted a misdemeanor.
STATUTES
At the turn of the century, the states began to enact statutes specifi-
cally dealing with the authority of an officer to break and enter in order
to make an arrest. 9 Although initially the vast majority of these
statutes expressly required some form of notice prior to forcible entry,20
14 13 Mass. 520 (1816).
18 Keith v. Johnson, 31 Ky. 604 (1833).
16 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
17 53 Ky. 395 (1854).
18 120 Mass. 190 (1876).
19 See notes 21-80 and accompanying text infra for a treatment of various state stat-
utes dealing with the authority to execute search or arrest warrants via forced entry.
20 See Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 508 (1964).
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a more recent trend has been toward the elimination of the notice
requirement under specified conditions.
California
California has developed a fairly stringent approach to noncom-
pliance with the "knock and notice" provisions of its penal code. The
California statute closely resembles its federal counterpart, section 3109
of the Criminal Code, 21 but the decisions of the California judiciary
have developed a far more substantial basis for it than the federal courts.
In addition, the large number of California decisions has placed that
state in a position of leadership with respect to the numerous other
states which have identical or very similar statutes.22 Thus, it is appro-
priate that our discussion of the relevant statutes should begin with an
examination of the California experience.
Section 844 of the California Penal Code provides:
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense be a felony, and
in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of
the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they
have reasonable grounds for believing him to be, after having
demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admit-
tance is desired.23
On its face, the statute is merely a codification of the common law and,
as such, the very fact that the common-law exceptions were omitted
would seem to preclude any form of no-knock arrest or search. Never-
theless, in 1956, compliance with the statute was interpreted by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Maddox24 to be excused under
the common-law exceptions to the rule of announcement.2 5 Thus, an-
nouncement before arrest was excused if the facts known to the officer
21 The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary
to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
22 See notes 44-80 and accompanying text infra.
23 CALIF. PENAL CODE § 844 (West Supp. 1968).
24 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956). In Maddox, the police
had defendant's premises under surveillance for approximately a month and had wit-
nessed known narcotics addicts frequenting the place. In fact, on the day of the arrest
and immediately prior thereto, the police arrested two addicts who stated that they had
just left the premises. When the police knocked on defendant's door, they were told to
"wait a minute," and then they heard the sound of retreating footsteps. They then broke
the door and entered the house. See also People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855
(1955).
25 See 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 14 n,21 (1955).
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before his entry were sufficient to support his good faith that com-
pliance would have increased his peril or frustrated the arrest.28 Addi-
tionally, in Maddox, as well as in a series of similar cases which fol-
lowed, destruction of evidence was recognized as another ground for
noncompliance with section 844 or its warrant counterpart, section
1531.27 The destruction exception was traditionally limited to narcotics
and bookmaking paraphernalia, since it was based on the assumption
that, by the very nature of these items, they were easily disposable. The
California courts extended this standard in narcotic cases (which com-
prised the bulk of the cases in this area) by not requiring any showing
whatever of particular exigency, as would generally be required to
excuse compliance with the knock or notice provisions of its statutes.
During the decade following Maddox, the California courts failed
to grant suppression motions on unlawful entry pleas. 28 Finally, in
1967, in an abrupt reversal, the California Supreme Court in People
v. Gastelo29 declared:
we have excused compliance with the statute in accordance with
established common law exceptions to the notice and demand re-
quirements on the basis of the specific facts involved. No such basis
exists for nullifying the statute in all narcotics cases, and, by
logical extension, in all other cases involving easily disposable
evidence.30
Thus, the Court clearly foreclosed noncompliance with the statutory
requirements of knock and notice when such noncompliance was based
solely on the police officer's "general experience relative to the dis-
posability and the kind of evidence sought and the propensity of
offenders to effect disposal." 3' 1
"Just as the police must have sufficiently particular reason to enter
26 Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822).
27 The officer may break open any outer door or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.
CALIF. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West 1956). See cases collected in People v. DeSantiago, 71
A.C. 18, 453 P.2d 353, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1969).
28 See Blakey, supra note 20, at 532 n.245.
20 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967). In Gastelo, the police, on
the basis of a reliable informant's report that he had purchased narcotics from defendant
at the apartment of defendant's girlfriend, obtained a warrant for the search of said
apartment. Early one morning four officers went to the apartment, and without knocking,
announcing their purpose or demanding admittance, they forced entry. The police served
the warrant, searched the apartment and found a small packet of heroin. Defendant was
arrested and later confessed to possession of the heroin. On appeal from his conviction,
defendant contended that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in admitting
the heroin into evidence over his objection that it was illegally seized.
zo Id. at 588, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
31 People v. DeSantiago, 71 A.C. 18, 24, 453 P.2d 353, 359, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 815 (1969).
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at all, so must they have some particular reason to enter in the manner
chosen."82 The Court further stated that the particular reason for the
mode of entry had to be based upon specific facts which would lead a
police officer to reasonably conciude that the occupants of the place to
be searched had resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intru-
sion.33
A month and a half later, in Meyer v. United States,3 4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing the Gastelo case,
granted a motion to suppress evidence seized in a raid on a "bookie
operation where officers had no reason for omitting a prior announce-
ment of their identity and purpose except general knowledge that de-
struction of evidence [betting slips] was likely in this type of offense." 35
The court, quoting from Gastelo, stated:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be
made to justify any kind of police action attempting to disturb
the security of people in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry
is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and cannot be
justified on a blanket basis. Otherwise the constitutional test of
reasonableness would turn only on practical expediency, and the
amendment's primary safeguard - the requirement of particular-
ity- would be lost.3 6
It at once became apparent that Gastelo (on the state level) and
Meyer (on the federal level) were redefining the constitutional and
practical limits of the knock and announce rule in a relatively exacting
manner. Then, in People v. Carillo,3 7 the California Court retreated
slightly from the strict position it had assumed in Gastelo, by permit-
ting noncompliance when, immediately prior to entry, the arresting
officers were able to detect activity from within the residence which
might lead them to reasonably conclude that the occupants within were
then engaged in the destruction of the evidence sought.
In People v. Rosales,8s and again in Greven v. Superior Court,39
the Court attempted to clearly delineate the parameters of excusable
noncompliance with the knock and notice requirements of sections 844
and 1531. Defining the constitutional basis of the announcement re-
82 67 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1967).
33 Cf. People v. Barnett, 156 Cal. App. 2d 803, 820 P.2d 128 (1958).
34 886 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967).
35 Id. at 718.
36 Id.
37 64 Cal. 2d 387, 412 P.2d 377, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1968), citing Ker v. California, 874
US. 23, 46 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
38 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
39 71 A.C. 803, 455 P.2d 432, 78 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1969).
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quirement, the Rosales Court stated "that [this] requirement is ... the
essence . . . which safeguard[s] individual liberty."40 The Court also
emphasized that such rules reflect a concern not only for the rights of
persons suspected of crimes but also for the security of innocent persons
who may be on the premises. Similarly, the Greven Court noted that
"the reverence of the laws for the individual's right of privacy in his
house [is paramount]," 41 and then expounded upon the public policy
argument of discouraging, whenever possible, creation of situations
conducive to violence.42 It went on to state that substantial compliance
with the knock and notice rule required at least an identifying an-
nouncement by officers, even if the exigencies of the situation would
have prevented a statement of purpose. This, the Court stated, was as
far as the case would stretch the term "substantial compliance" for
excusing law enforcement authorities from the mandates of sections 844
and 1531 of the penal code.
Thus, the California courts have placed the fourth amendment in
a fairly prominent position, restricting to a great degree the latitude
of discretion previously accorded law enforcement authorities. But
the restrictions have been fairly realistic, leaving the court, rather
than a formalistic rule, the arbiter of new situations arising out of
searches and arrests. This approach, as will be seen, is far more flexible
than the District of Columbia's approach which rejects most judicial
exceptions to its knock and notice statute.43
Florida
Florida has a statute similar to California, but has adopted a much
stricter approach to its interpretation. 44 For example, in Benefield v.
40 68 Cal. 2d at 304, 437 P.2d at 492, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 4, quoting Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan). The Court also quoted
from Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 801 (1958), but did not apply the virtually certain
test. Rather, the Court required a reasonable good faith belief as to the exceptions to
the announcement requirement provided such belief was accompanied by more than
general knowledge as to the comparative ease of disposing of narcotics. For a discussion
of Miller, see notes 85-96 and accompanying text infra. Rosales held that the failure of
the enforcement authorities to explain their purpose and demand entrance vitiated the
arrest. The police, acting on information that defendant was selling narcotics, had ob-
served him from the window and surrounded the house prior to forcing entry. Under these
facts, noncompliance with section 844 could not be excused since there was "no suspicious
activity," and "no evidence that would justify a belief that such compliance would have
increased the officer's peril, frustrated the arrest, or resulted in the destruction of the
evidence."
4171 A.C. at 206, 455 P.2d at 425, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 507, quoting Miller v. United
States, 357 US. 201, 313 (1958).
42 Id. at 307, 455 P.2d at 436, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
43 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 201, 309 (1958); Hair v. United States, 289
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
44 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.19 (1965).
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State,45 the Supreme Court of Florida noted that its statute, a mere
codification of the common law, was not burdened by the exceptions
to the knock and announce rule which had been engrafted by the Cali-
fornia courts onto their statute.46 Nonetheless, the Court then devised
four exceptions to the Florida rule:
1. where the person within already knows the officer's au-
thority and purpose;
2. where the officers are justified in the belief that the persons
within are in imminent peril of bodily harm;
3. if the officer's peril would have been increased had he de-
manded entrance and stated the purpose or,
4. where those within made aware of the presence of someone
outside are then engaged in activities which justify the officers in
the belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being at-
tempted.47
The following year, in Koptyra v. State,48 the Florida District Court of
Appeals was confronted with a no-notice entry situation in which no
force was involved. An undercover agent, after attending a "pot party"
for a short time, left and returned shortly thereafter with additional
officers to arrest those present at the party. The agent, who was ad-
mitted to the house upon knocking, merely permitted his colleagues to
follow him through the door. In concert, they then proceeded to arrest
the occupants and to search the entire area immediately adjacent
thereto.49 The court affirmed the conviction, but sidestepped the con-
stitutional issue by distinguishing Benefield on the ground that the case
at bar did not involve a breaking. This interpretation, of course, was
rendered inapplicable.
Thus, it appears that the present state of the exceptions in Florida,
i.e., those stated in Benefield, represent a stricter interpretation of the
common-law exceptions to knock and notice than California has
adopted.
45 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964). The facts in Benefield closely parallel Miller v. United
States, 357 US. 301 (1958). For a discussion of Miller, see notes 85-96 and accom-
panying text infra. The Benefield court rejected the State's reliance upon Ker as justifica-
tion for noncompliance with the statute.
46 Id. at 710.
47 Id. In Benefield, the police gained access to defendant's home by opening an un-
locked door. Immediately prior to the entry, one Hollander had informed the officers
that he had deposited money with defendant as a "payoff" to secure a liquor license.
Under these facts, the unannounced entry was regarded as violative of the Florida
statute.
48 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. D. Ct. 1965).
49 Under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), such a search incidental to an
arrest would no longer be permitted. See notes 123-124 and accompanying text infra.
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Utah
Utah, Idaho, Iowa and South Dakota, 50 like Florida and many
other states which have adopted statutes resembling the knock and
notice provisions of the California Penal Code, have used California's
decisions as a basis for interpreting their own statutes. For example,
in 1967, Utah amended its search warrant provision to read:
Officer may break door or window to execute warrant- Au-
thority. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to
execute the warrant:
(1) If, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the judge,justice or magistrate issuing the warrant has inserted a direction
therein that the officer executing it shall not be required to give
such notice. The judge, justice or magistrate may so direct only
upon proof under oath, to his satisfaction that the property sought
is a narcotic, illegal drug, or other similar substance which may be
easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to the
life or limb of the officer or any other may result, if such notice
were to be given.51
Clearly, this provision merely codified California case law as it existed
immediately prior to the Gastelo,52 Rosales,5 3 and Greven"4 cases. Al-
though the Utah Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the statute, it
has, in essence (at least on its face), rejected the fourth amendment
based argument. Instead, it has adopted an expanded common-law ap-
proach, requiring a mere affirmation by the arresting officer that the
object sought was of an easily disposable nature without any require-
ment as to the exigencies of the situation. Yet, the Utah Supreme Court
has been at least somewhat cognizant of the constitutional ramifications
of the no-knock provision. In State v. Louden,5 5 the Court, addressing
itself to a slightly different situation, noted that, while constitutional
safeguards were not to be ignored, nevertheless they were to be weighed
against the "practical exigencies of police work. ' 56 This case seems to
50 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-12 (1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-611, 19-4409 (1948);
IowA CODE ANN. § 751.9 (1950); S.D. CODE §§ 23-22-18, 23-15-14 (1967).
51 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-54-9 (1953).
52 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
53 68 Cal. 2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968).
54 71 A.C. 303, 455 P.2d 432, 78 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1969).
55 15 Utah 2d 64, 387 P.2d 240 (1963).
6 Id. at 67, 387 P.2d at 243. The Court discussed in detail the constitutional safe-
guards espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963). For a discussion of this case, see notes 100-07 and accompanying text infra.
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have been the extent of Utah's consideration of no-knock, and repre-
sents, at best, an evasion of the constitutional issue- at least for the
time being.
Washington
Washington, which also has a statute similar to California's section
844, has interpreted noncompliance with the knock and announce rule
in a slightly different manner than California. Addressing itself to the
constitutional issue in State v. Young,57 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that, "when officers come armed with a search warrant,
forcible entry without announcement of identity and purpose may be
justified when exigent and necessitous circumstances exist."58 Since
such circumstances may be deemed to exist when, "narcotics or other
property subject to immediate destruction" are involved,59 the Wash-
ington Court adopted a position which is roughly analogous to the
post-Maddox attitude of the California courts.60
New York, Nebraska, South Carolina and North Dakota
Several states have adopted a slightly different approach to the no-
knock exceptions to the rule requiring notice of identity and purpose
by the arresting officer. Nebraska, New York, North Dakota and South
Carolina6' have included the requirement of judicial approval for a
no-knock direction to any arrest or search warrant. Illustrative is sec-
don 799 of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure which specifies:
The officer may break open an outer or inner door or window
of a building, or any part of the building, or anything therein, to
execute the warrant, (a) if, after notice of his authority and pur-
pose, he be refused admittance, or (b) without notice of his au-
thority and purpose, if the judge, justice or magistrate issuing the
warrant has inserted a direction therein that the officer executing
it shall not be required to give such notice. The judge, justice or
magistrate may so direct only upon proof under oath, to his satis-
faction, that the property sought may be easily and quickly de-
stroyed or disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of the
officer or another may result, if such notice were to be given.62
57 76 Wash. 2d 212, 455 P.2d 595 (1969).
58 Id. at 214, 455 P.2d at 598. The Court cited both Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963) and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958). Id. at 213-14, 455 P.2d at 597.
59 The Washington Supreme Court specifically noted that its new rule was similar
to the Maddox case. Id. at 214, 455 P.2d at 598.
60 Id.
61 NEB. REv. STAT. § 29411 (1965); N.Y. CODE Cim. PROC. §§ 175, 178, 799 (McKinney
1964); N.D. CODE § 29-29.1-01 (1967); S.C. CODE §§ 17-257, 53-198 (1962).
62 N.Y. CODE Clum. PROC. § 799 (McKinney 1964).
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There is presently a controversy as to whether the addition of this
clause requiring judicial approval will satisfy the fourth amendment
reasonableness requirement set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Ker v. California.63 One point of view can be found in People
v. DeLago.64 There, the New York Court of Appeals permitted police
officers armed with a search warrant to make an unannounced entry at
the apartment of the defendant where
it was represented to the court by affidavit that gambling materials
were likely to be found at this location and in issuing the warrant,
the court could take judicial notice that contraband of that nature
is easily secreted or destroyed if persons unlawfully in possession
thereof are notified in advance that the premises are about to be
searched. 65
Citing and discussing Ker and Maddox, the Court found that the police
tactics were inoffensive to constitutional standards, and that section
799, which authorizes the inclusion of the no-knock provision in the
search warrant after judicial approval, was also in compliance with
the mandates of the fourth amendment. The Court made this finding
notwithstanding the fact that
there [was] nothing in the affidavit to show specifically how or
where these gambling materials would be likely to be destroyed or
removed, [because] the likelihood they would be was an inference
of fact which the Judge signing the warrant might draw.66
Thus DeLago indicates that the New York courts recognize that
there is a question of constitutional dimension, but that exigent cir-
cumstances, which do not have to be supported by specific facts, remove
the forcible entry from constitutional condemnation. It is also worth
noting that the lower New York courts have held that an unannounced
entry could be made without a warrant if there existed probable cause
to arrest and exigent circumstances justified noncompliance with the
statute.67
63 374 US. 23 (1963). For a discussion of this case, see notes 100-07 and accom-
panying text infra.
64 16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963
(1966).
65 Id. at 292, 213 N.E.2d at 661, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
66Id.
67 People v. McIlvain, 28 App. Div. 2d 711, 281 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1967); People
v. Montanaro, 24 Misc. 2d 624, 229 I .YS.2d 677 (Kings County Ct. 1962); People v.
Cocchiara, 31 isc. 2d 495, 221 N.YS.2d 856 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1961).
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District of Columbia
Basically, three statutes concern search warrant entries in the
District of Columbia, and all three have very similar language; 8 two
are local statutes applicable only to the District, 9 while the third,
section 3109 of the Criminal Code,70 is of general application. For
many years the latter has been held applicable to the District of
Columbia, and the case law for any of the three has been considered
almost interchangeable.7 1 Each of the statutes bears a marked resem-
blance to the California statute, yet they have been interpreted in an
entirely different manner by the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts in the District. While the California courts have engrafted
a series of exceptions onto their statute, decisions in the District of
Columbia relating to section 3109 have continued to interpret any
possible exceptions to the "knock and wait" rule in a highly restrictive
manner.
One of the major cases in the District of Columbia was Accarino
v. United States,72 which involved a warrantless arrest and search, and
a subsequent gambling conviction. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit discussed at length the common-law back-
ground of the rule requiring notice and announcement of purpose.73
Emphasizing "a man's right of privacy in his home," the Accarino
court rejected the Government's repeated attempts to excuse its failure
to obtain a warrant for the forcible arrest and search. (Accarino was
subsequently utilized by the District of Columbia courts as a basis for
their interpretation of the District of Columbia and federal warrant
statutes.)
In 1958 the landmark case of Miller v. United States74 was handed
down by the Supreme Court. It would serve no purpose to discuss
Miller extensively at this point, since the case will be treated in con-
siderable depth in a subsequent section.75 Suffice it to say that Mr.
68 The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary
to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
69 D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-129(g) (1957) (liquor); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33- 4 14(g) (1967)
(narcotics).
70 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958); See Blakey, supra note
20, at 513 for a more complete explanation of the application of section 3109 to the
District of Columbia.
72 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
73 Id. at 460; see Blakey, supra note 20, at 510-14.
74 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
75 See notes 85-96 and accompanying text infra. See generally Blakey, supra note 20,
at 516-31.
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Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court,
evaded the issue of whether section 3109, as a codification* of the
common law, implicitly encompassed exceptions adopted in such states
as California with the statement "whether the unqualified require-
ments of the rule admit an exception justifying noncompliance in exi-
gent circumstances is not a question we are called upon to decide in
this case." 76 However, other decisions by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit interpreted possible exceptions to section 3109 in a fairly strict
manner, requiring almost total compliance with the statute's mandates.
For example, in Masiello v. United States,7 7 there was a conflict in the
testimony as to whether or not the police, who had announced only
their presence before entering the premises, had notified the defendant
that they had a search warrant. The court remanded the case to deter-
mine if the police had in fact totally complied with the statute's knock
and notification requirements. Similarly, in Keiningham v. United
States78 and Hair v. United States,79 the court stated that the Miller
rule requires police officers "who seek to invade the privacy of an indi-
vidual's home to announce their authority and their purpose in de-
manding entrance before 'barging in.'-"0 These decisions indicate a
judicial reluctance to permit any expansion of no-knock in the District
of Columbia.
II. ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE CONSTTUTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution de-
nounces only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. This is a word
which, quite naturally, has confounded legal scholars for hundreds of
years. Yet, the fourth amendment was approved only after the inclusion
of the language banning "unreasonable seizures and searches." '81 Un-
doubtedly, individual reaction against the so-called "general warrants"
or "writs of assistance" was primarily responsible for its inclusion.
However, as was previously indicated, neither this attitude nor the
76 357 U.S. at 309.
77 304 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
78 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
79 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
8o ld. at 896. It is worth noting that the Hair court excluded evidence of gambling
paraphernalia; several state courts have held such material to be "easily disposable"
contraband which would permit noncompliance with their knock and notice statutes.
The Hair decision was merely a reaffirmation of a similar holding in an earlier case. See
Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
81 See B. MrrcHru & L. MrrcEmLL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CoNsTrr=oN OF THE UNITn
,STATES 199 (1964).
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standard was novel. The common law was fairly well settled against
unreasonable searches in general, although no rules of reason had been
clearly defined. Use of the term "unreasonable" was, of course, practical
and, at the same time, the most farsighted way of satisfying current
feeling in 1789, while providing flexibility for the future. Nevertheless,
the term must have had some definite connotations to the founding
fathers and their contemporaries during the consideration and ap-
proval of the Bill of Rights. The growth of the law in this area would
tend to obscure this fact, although modem courts often pay lip service
(and sometimes more) to common-law trends and traditions.*82 It might
be well to bear in mind the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft on this
subject:
The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,
and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as
the interests and rights of individual citizens.85
The language of the fourth amendment suggests that the search
and seizure itself was of primary concern to the drafters. The protec-
tion of the amendment extends to "persons, houses, papers, and
effects," each of which can involve different factual circumstances.
Whether an announcement of purpose is required for any or all of
these protected entities is beyond the scope of the present discussion,
for the Supreme Court in recent years has evidently concluded that a
statement of identity and purpose is a basic prerequisite to entry into
a home without the occupant's acquiescence - a prerequisite that has
constitutional dimensions.84 However, the road to this conclusion is
sinuous at best, being paved with inconsistencies as well as exceptions.
Furthermore, the end of the road is not necessarily in sight.
In deciding the case of Miller v. United States, 5 Mr. Justice
Brennan and his colleagues were, in effect, confronting the rule of an-
82 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 US. 301 (1958); Accarino v. United States, 179
F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
83 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182, 149 (1924).
84 Ker v. California, 874 U.S. 23 (1963).
85 357 U.S. 301 (1958). In Miller the officers involved had neither a search nor an
arrest warrant. After arriving at the apartment in question, one of the officers knocked
on the door, and in response to an inquiry as to who was there, replied in a low voice,
"police." The defendant opened the door slightly, leaving the safety chain intact. Upon
seeing the officer, he immediately started to close it. However, one officer grabbed the
door and was able to force entry by breaking the chain. Miller and his girlfriend were
arrested, and a search of the apartment uncovered marked informant money. The de-
fendants' pretrial motion to suppress the evidence as illegally seized was denied, and
when the trial judge subsequently refused to consider the question of suppression, the
defendants were found guilty of violating the District of Columbia's narcotics laws. This
conviction had been affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
[VOL. 44:626
NO-KNOCK AND NONSENSE
nouncement for the first time. In rendering its decision, the Supreme
Court quite naturally turned to Accarino, which was considered some-
thing of a landmark at the time due to its extensive discussion of the
common-law rule on forcible entry. Accarino, like Miller, involved a
case arising in the District of Columbia, but there are several factors
which make Mr. Justice Brennan's deference to "the rule of Accarino"
somewhat unfortunate. To begin with, Accarino was based, to a great
extent, upon the absence of an arrest warrant. Judge Prettyman had
concluded:
Unless the necessities of the moment require that the officer break
down a door, he cannot do so without a warrant; and if in reason-
able contemplation there is opportunity to get a warrant, or the
arrest could as well be made by some other method, the outer door
to a dwelling cannot be broken to make an arrest without a war-
rant.80
It was primarily on this basis that the Accarino court had determined
that the evidence, which was seized following the forced entry and
subsequent arrest of the defendant by law enforcement officers, should
have been excluded. Unfortunately, however, Judge Prettyman chose
to add the following comment:
Upon one topic there appears to be no dispute in the authorities.
Before an officer can break open a door to a home, he must make
known the cause of his demand for entry.87
If indeed there had been no dispute prior to Accarino, it was because
the issue had never been squarely presented in a modem criminal case.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the common law was by no
means fixed on this point (except in the general agreement that there
were reasonable exceptions to any announcement rule which might
exist).
Miller, like Accarino, was decided on non-constitutional grounds.
Language to the contrary notwithstanding, a close reading reveals that
Miller stands as a determination of District of Columbia law, the
fourth amendment being only indirectly involved. As in Accarino, the
officers who arrested Miller after the forced entry had no warrant.
Both cases speak in terms of a common-law right of privacy in the
home. 8 Similarly, both cite Semayne's Cases9 as well, but while Ac-
carino recognized that this venerable decision concerned a writ issued
86 179 F.2d at 464.
87 Id. at 465.
88 557 U.S. at 313; 179 F.2d at 464.
89 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (Ex. 1603).
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in a civil case,90 Miller recited the oft-quoted pronouncement as if it
related to breaking in order to arrest for a felony.91 Such a misconcep-
tion with regard to Semayne's Case, and to the entire body of Anglo-
American law on this subject, is regrettably not uncommon. More
serious is the fact that Mr. Justice Brennan failed to reach any con-
clusions with respect to common-law exceptions (such as the immediate
threat of violence). Additionally, the rationale underlying the notice
rule, i.e., that a knock of notice was, in most cases, the better way to
avoid violence which might breach the King's peace, was completely
ignored. The concept of privacy, as relied upon by Miller,92 is a some-
what later and more amorphous development. Prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, the statement that "the King's keys unlock all
doors"9 3 was probably closer to the truth.
Although Miller may be based upon "the rule of Accarino" or
District of Columbia law, its implications are broader because of the
majority's insistence on relating its holding to section 3109 of the
Criminal Code.9 4 In Mr. Justice Brennan's view, this section reflected
a congressional desire to codify the traditional rules of forced entry.95
He construed it as a restatement of Semayne's Case, and therefore
applicable, in effect, to all forcible entries, although by its language
section 3109 is limited to the execution of search warrants. The am-
biguity thus developed is evidenced by the decisions which followed
Miller9 6
In Wong Sun v. United States,9 7 the Supreme Court's next major
opportunity to consider its holding in Miller, Mr. Justice Brennan
again articulated for the majority. Here, agents had forcibly entered a
dwelling without a prior notice of authority and purpose, although one
of the agents apparently identified himself to the defendant before
forcing open the door to effectuate the arrest.9 8 Mr. Justice Brennan re-
peated the "virtual certainty" test he formulated in Miller, but could
find no facts justifying the conclusion that the officers were virtually
90 179 F.2d at 460. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
91 357 U.S. at 308.
92 Id. at 307.
93 BRoom's LEGAL MAXiMs, supra note 4, at 432.
94 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
95357 U.S. at 313.
96 See, e.g., United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1962), where Judge
Lord relied upon Miller as interpreting section 3109 to apply to the broad range of search
and seizure situations. As he put it, "[p]lainly stated, the Court had to decide not the
application of a local rule as such, but whether or not the criteria of section 3109 has
been met .... " Id. at 845.
97 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
98 Id. at 474.
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certain that the defendant already knew their purpose. However, the
door to other exceptions recognized at common law was opened some-
what wider in Wong Sun, when Mr. Justice Brennan specifically men-
tioned the exceptions of "the imminent destruction of vital evidence,
or the need to rescue a victim in peril" 99 while reiterating the fact that
the Government claimed no such circumstances in the case.
Up to this point, "the knock" itself had not yet assumed constitu-
tional proportions; prior holdings were based on common law, state
law, section 3109, and various combinations of these authorities. Con-
sequently, the stage was not particularly well set for'Ker v. Cali-
fornia.100 Mr. Justice Clark, who had dissented in both Miller and
Wong Sun, wrote for the Ker majority. Mr. Justice Brennan, on the
other hand, authored the dissent, which expressed the views of the
Chief Justice and two other Justices as well.10 1 Although the decision
was extremely close, there was virtual unanimity on one point: the
rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement implicit in the
fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. But, while the minority felt that the circumstances in Ker
did not satisfy any exceptions to the "knock" requirement which they
were willing to recognize, the majority was of the view that
in the particular circumstances of this case the officers' method of
entry, sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable
under the standards of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 02
George and Diane Ker were undoubtedly surprised when law
enforcement officers quietly utilized a pass key to enter their apartment.
In fact, they neglected to conceal a two pound brick of marihuana which
was resting ostentatiously in their kitchen. More marihuana was subse-
quently discovered in both the kitchen and bedroom after the Kers
were arrested. There was no warrant obtained, nor was there any an-
nouncement of identity and purpose, prior to the officers' surreptitious
entry. The omission of notice was ostensibly to prevent the destruction
of evidence,x0 3 and was sanctioned by a judicial exception to the Cali-
fornia statute which ordinarily required announcement. 04
Although no force was used to effect the entry in Ker, the majority
99 Id. at 484.
100 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
101 Id. at 46.
102 Id. at 40-41.
103 Id. at 28.
104 See, e.g., People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858
(1956) discussed at note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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recognized that the use of a pass key under these circumstances was the
legal equivalent of a breaking. However, the Court refused to consider
the question of entry by ruse or trickery,10 5 thereby fostering future
uncertainty on this issue. Additionally, despite the fact that this area
is pervaded with unresolved questions, the Court chose to overlook
the opportunity to clarify the relevant standards. In relying upon "the
particular circumstances of this case,"' 06 Mr. Justice Clark evidently
recognized a "destruction of evidence" exception, but refused to discuss
other "exigent circumstances" - although Mr. Justice Brennan listed
his three somewhat restrictive exceptions. 107 Similarly, the majority
opinion did not clarify whether the same result would obtain in this
case if federal rather than state officers had been involved, or if a
search or arrest warrant had been issued. But one thing must be said
for Ker: although the rules for its application were left uncertain, with
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Brennan polarized, an exception to
the announcement rule was incorporated into the fourth amendment
for situations where there is a reasonable possibility that evidence
might otherwise be destroyed.
At least one jurisdiction felt that the destruction exception set
forth in Ker should be clarified to a much greater degree. In Meyer v.
United States,08 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced
with a situation in which the police had, by their own admission, failed
to comply with the state statute. The omission of the required knock
and notice was based solely upon the general knowledge of the arrest-
ing officers regarding the disposability of paraphernalia used in book-
making operations. The Government conceded that a violation of the
knock and announce provisions of the statute would render the arrest
and subsequent search invalid and the evidence obtained inadmissible.
It argued, however, that because of the general nature of bookmaking
paraphernalia, the Ker destruction exception excused noncompliance
with the statute. The Ninth Circuit, in a per curiam decision, flatly
rejected this position. Citing the Gastelo case'09 as controlling, the
105 See Jones v. United States, 804 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 US.
851 (1963); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810
(1960), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 364 US. 945 (1961).
106 374 U.S. at 40-41.
107 (1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and pur-
pose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are
in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within, made aware of the
presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the
door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an
escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.
Id. at 47 (dissenting opinion).
108 886 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1967).
109 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
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court stated that neither it nor the Supreme Court had ever held that
mere disposability of the evidence sought would render a no-knock,
forcible entry constitutionally reasonable. The court noted that the
Supreme Court in Ker had divided four-to-four on the question of
whether the evidence offered to excuse compliance with the notice and
demand requirements was in fact constitutionally sufficient. It con-
strued Ker as excusing compliance with the statute, in accordance with
the established common-law exceptions, only on the basis of the
specific facts presented in that case; "[o]therwise, the constitutional test
of reasonableness would turn only on practical expediency and the
[fourth] amendment's primary safeguard - the requirement of par-
ticularity - would be lost."110
Meyer thus attempted to clarify the destruction exception set forth
in Ker. Clearly, in the Ninth Circuit's view, that case stood for the
proposition that no-knock is permissible in the destruction of evidence
situation. However, it is equally clear that the Meyer court would
require a more stringent form of judicial review based upon the par-
ticularity of the facts in the case at hand.
In reliance upon Ker,"'1 some states have codified the destruction
of evidence exception, and have authorized the issuance of no-knock
warrants;"12 predictably, state courts appear to be upholding such legis-
lation. 13 Sabbath v. United States,1 4 the most recent Supreme Court
decision in this area, indicates that these courts are on relatively safe
ground. Although the decision in Sabbath turned upon an application
of section 3109, rather than the fourth amendment, Mr. Justice Mar-
shall's opinion helped to purify a few of Ker's muddy waters. It verified
that all entries into dwellings by federal officers are to be tested in
terms of section 3109; any unannounced entry constitutes a "breaking,"
regardless of actual force employed. This should not be surprising,
especially in view of Ker. However, entry by ruse was once again set
110 386 F.2d at 718.
111 The Supreme Court has refused thus far to reconsider its position in Ker. See
La Peluso v. California, 239 Cal. App. 2d 715, 49 Cal. Rptr. 85, cert. denied, 385 US. 829
(1966).
112 See, e.g., Na. REv. STAT. § 29-411 (1964); N.Y. CODE Caum. PRoc. § 799 (McKinney
Supp. 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-54-9 (1967).
113 See, e.g., People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966). For a discussion of this, see notes 64-67 and
accompanying text supra.
114 391 U.S. 585 (1968). In Sabbath, customs agents had apprehended one Jones
crossing the border from Mexico to California with cocaine allegedly given him by the
defendant. The cocaine was also to be delivered to the defendant and the officers ar-
ranged for Jones to make the delivery. They waited five or ten minutes outside the
defendant's apartment after Jones had entered to make delivery. Then the agents, with-
out a warrant, knocked, waited a few seconds, and then opened the unlocked door.
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apart, which in itself provides some clarification.115 Most importantly,
the Court reinforced the concept of implicit exceptions to the constitu-
tional rule of announcement. It did so in a somewhat curious way,
however, utilizing a footnote which speaks in terms of "[e]xceptions to
any possible constitutional rule."'116 And in referring to the "recog-
nized" exceptions, the note cites Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Ker
without reference to the majority opinion in that case. One can only
conclude that this reference was due to Mr. Justice Brennan's neat
exposition of what he viewed to be the exceptions - something Mr.
Justice Clark and the majority failed to do. In other words, the citation
should not be construed as favoring the minority view of the destruc-
tion of evidence exception over the majority view, thereby impliedly
circumscribing, if not overruling, the holding in Ker. However, one
cannot help but wish, once again, for greater certainty.
Where, then, are we at this point? For one thing, we seem to have
a federal statute" 7 which is duplicative of both the common law and
the Constitution. In the alternative, it appears that entries by state
officers will be judged by state law and reviewed by fourth amendment
standards in appropriate cases. On the other hand, entries by federal
officers will be scrutinized in terms of section 3109, which codifies the
common law. Both section 3109 and the fourth amendment contem-
plate exceptions in exigent circumstances, but whether section 3109 is
more stringent in application cannot yet be determined. Certainly, there
is a constitutionally recognized exception to the announcement rule,
and a properly drafted amendment to section 3109 reflecting the excep-
tion for potential destruction of evidence should pass constitutional
muster. Other exceptions might survive judicial scrutiny as well." 8
One thing is certain: the constant growth in drug traffic is resulting in
increased pressure from law enforcement agencies which will, in turn,
encourage a corresponding growth in the law - or, if not growth, at
the very least a clarification or refinement of existing standards.
Proponents of a strict announcement requirement have created a
constitutional certainty from a common-law uncertainty. A structure
resting upon such dubious foundation cannot long avoid some shifting.
Undoubtedly, our founding fathers themselves would have disagreed if
115 Id. at 590 n.7, which indicates that the Court is not willing to go out of its
way to undermine the established view of entry by ruse as being outside the scope of
"breaking." Raised as a constitutional issue, the result might be different.
116 Id. at 591 n.8.
117 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
118 E.g., to avoid loss of life or when there is virtual certainty that the officers' pur-
pose is known.
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asked specifically in 1789 whether they considered unannounced entries
into dwellings "unreasonable." In fact, the exclusionary rule itself was
not clearly formulated until almost one hundred years had elapsed.119
Nor could they have foreseen the growth in organized crime and the
impact of present day gambling and drug traffic. To elevate the an-
nouncement rule to a constitutional requirement in 1963 was prob-
ably historically unsound. To premise it upon a vague right of privacy,
rather than on the avoidance of potential violence was a further de-
parture from precedent. Still, the rule exists and, as long as the right to
individual privacy is, in fact, balanced with the public interest in sup-
pressing illegal gambling and drug peddling, who will complain?
It is difficult to see, however, what actual protection is given to any
right of privacy by the announcement rule. Once identity and purpose
are stated, entry must always be permitted; if permission is denied, or
even delayed for an inordinate amount of time, entry may be forced,
provided the officer has a valid purpose in gaining admission. Since no
discretion is vested in the occupant, in what manner does notice protect
his privacy? If he has something to hide, perhaps the knock will provide
him with more time to conceal or destroy it. If he plans to resist or flee,
he will be alerted. On the other hand, if he plans none of these and is
otherwise lawfully engaged, how will the knock benefit him? If the
door is locked, he may be able to avoid a broken door by responding to
the demand for entry. If he is engaged in very private activities, per-
haps of a carnal nature, or is otherwise indisposed, he may have time to
avoid embarrassment - but not interruption. Or if he is asleep, he
will be spared the possible shock of awakening to the sight of a stranger
in his home (entry by stealth), or of awakening to the sound of a break-
ing door.
Thus balanced, the protections to privacy seem to be somewhat
tenuous when compared to the potential for public harm. This is
particularly true with respect to potential destruction of evidence,
especially when one considers that the probable cause requirement
would have to be met in any event. And where a statute provides for
the issuance of no-knock warrants, the judicial review factor must be
added to the scales. In jurisdictions where such warrants are available,
courts should of course look with a jaundiced eye upon officers who
fail to obtain warrants without good cause. This is not to say that
privacy should not be protected - constitutionally, if necessary. Many,
if not most, searches would be "unreasonable" under the fourth amend-
ment if preceded by an unannounced entry. But there is an extreme
119 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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need for reasonable exceptions to be identified and clarified. Exclu-
sionary rules will not deter if they are not understood by the policeman
on the beat. 120
Perhaps our view of privacy should be reconsidered. Would it not
be inconsistent to permit electronic eavesdropping under the fourth
amendment with appropriate judicial supervision,121 while denying no-
knock entry under limited circumstances with similar supervision?
Which is the greater invasion of privacy? It bears repeating that, if we
are to continue to judge the announcement rule and its exceptions by
fourth amendment standards, the somewhat vague and recent concept
of privacy should not be given undue priority over traditional and
more comprehensible concepts of reasonableness. Language from Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz,122 which
was cited with approval by Mr. Justice Stewart in a more recent opinion
overruling Rabinowitz,123 helps to place the matter in perspective:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some
criteria of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for dis-
trict judges or the police to say that an "unreasonable search" is
forbidden -that the search must be reasonable. What is the test
of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the reason
underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history
and the experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded
by it against the evils to which it was a response.124
III. NEw APPROACHES To No-KNOCK
The proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act contains a
no-knock warrant provision similar to many of those mentioned earlier
in this article.125 Subsection (b) authorizes unannounced entries in cir-
120 See Blakey, supra note 20, at 533.
121 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
122 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
123 Chimel v. California, 895 U.S. 752, 760 (1969). In Chimel, police officers, after
serving the defendant with an arrest warrant at his home, proceeded to search the entire
house for items taken in an alleged burglary. The Court invalidated the search as being
unreasonable since, even though it was incidental to a valid arrest, there was no probable
cause. The Court limited a search incidental to an arrest to the arrestee's person and the
area "within his immediate control" -within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
124 395 US. at 765, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. at 83 (dissenting
opinion).
125 Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant relating to offenses involving
controlled dangerous substances the penalty for which is imprisonment for more
than one year may, without notice of his authority and purpose, break open an
outer or inner door or window of a building, or any part of the building or any-
thing therein, if the judge or United States Magistrate issuing the warrant is
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that (A) the property sought may
and if such notice is given, will be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
or (B) the giving of such notice will immediately endanger the life or safety of
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cumstances where the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant is satis-
fied that there is probable cause to believe that, if the officers knocked
and announced their authority and purpose, either the evidence sought
will be quickly destroyed or the officers placed in danger of physical
harm. These warrants may only be issued for offenses relating to con-
trolled dangerous substances, and the warrant must state on its face
that the officers executing it are authorized to dispense with knocking
or announcing their authority and purpose. In addition, there is a
requirement that the officers identify themselves and their purpose as
soon as possible after gaining entry.126
Strong opposition has been voiced against the proposed no-knock
provision on both constitutional and policy grounds. Critics contended
that the initial language of section 702(b), which authorized the issu-
ance of a no-knock warrant if "there is probable cause to believe that
if such notice were to be given the property at issuance in the case may
be easily and quickly disposed of .... "-127 was too ambiguous and that
it was susceptible to a wide variety of interpretations.128 Additionally,
they argued that the language did not make clear whether it was the na-
ture of the property that was intended to be a ground for issuance of the
warrant, or whether specific facts demonstrating that the occupants of
the premises to be searched were ready, willing, and able to destroy
the evidence at the first sign of police intrusion were required.129
The original intent of section 702(b) was to require a two-step
process for obtaining a no-knock warrant. The first was compliance
the executing officer or another person, and has included in the warrant a direc-
tion that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such notice: Pro-
vided, that any officer acting under such warrant, shall, as soon as practicable
after entering the premises, identify himself and give the reasons and authority
for his entrance upon the premises.
S.3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 702 (1970) (emphasis added).
126 This proviso was included in the Senate Judiciary Committee to insure reasonably
prompt notice to the occupants and thereby minimize the possibility of mistake of in-
tent and potential violence.
127 Before its amendment in the Senate, section 702(b) read: Any officer autho-
rized to execute a search warrant relating to offenses involving controlled dan-
gerous substances the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than one year
may, without notice of his authority and purpose, break open an outer or inner
door or window of a building, or any part of the building, or anything therein,
if the judge or United States Magistrate issuing the warrant is satisfied that
there is probable cause to believe that if such notice were to be given the
property sought in the case may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
or that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, and has
included in the warrant a direction that the officer executing it shall not be
required to give such notice: Provided, that any officer acting under such war-
rant, shall, as soon as practicable after entering the premises, identify himself
and give the reasons and authority for his entrance upon the premises. (Emphasis
added.)
128S. REP. No. 613, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 159 (1969).
129 Id.
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with the requirements necessary for obtaining a conventional search
warrant: that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that evidence or fruits of such crime are located on the
premises to be searched. The next step was that the applicants also
show that there is probably cause to believe that contraband drugs are
located on the premises and that, by their nature, they are capable
of quick destruction, and might in fact be so destroyed should the
occupants be made aware of an imminent police intrusion. In effect,
a number of elements was required: probable cause to believe that
contraband drugs were located on the premises, that such drugs
by their nature could be easily destroyed or disposed of, and that the
occupants of the premises would be likely to destroy such drugs upon
notice by the police of their intent to execute a search warrant. These
requirements clearly satisfied the criteria established in existing law. 30
Nevertheless, the extensive criticism which the original section 702(b)
was subjected to resulted in its amendment on the Senate floor;' 3 ' the
present language- "will be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed
of" and "will immediately endanger the life or safety of the executing
officer"' 32 - reflects this amendment.
An alternative approach would be to require positivity rather than
probable cause in any application for a no-knock authorization. This
would comport with the general standard for the issuance of nighttime
search warrants under rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 33 Simply stated, a positivity standard requires a greater
quantum of factual information than does the probable cause standard.
Under normal probable cause standards, the judge or magistrate does
not have to be positive that the evidence sought is located on the
premises to be searched in order to grant the warrant. Rather, the
applicant need only disclose sufficient facts to warrant an averment that
the evidence sought is likely to be on the premises. However, such
facts would be insufficient to meet the positivity test.'34
130 See notes 21-80 and accompanying text supra.
131 Section 702 was amended pursuant to a provision offered by Senator Robert
Griffin and strongly supported by Senator Joseph Tydings. Senator Tydings had success-
fully inserted similar "will result" language into the proposed District of Columbia
Court Reform and Reorganization Act. In the House version of the latter, H.R. 16196,
the "no-knock" provision merely requires that destruction or disposal be likely to result.
Presumably, this conflict will eventually be resolved.
132 See note 125 supra for the entire text of the proposed subsection.
133 FFm. R. Casm. P. 41(e).
134 Rule 41(e), which governs the issuance of nighttime search warrants, requires
that the affidavit disclose sufficient facts to warrant the affiant in asserting a positive
belief that the evidence is located on the premises to be searched. United States v. Raidl,
250 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1965). An exception is made to rule 41(e) for issuance of
search warrants involving narcotic drugs. By virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 1405 (1964), the execu-
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Adoption of a positivity test for the issuance of no-knock warrants
would mean that the applicant would have to disclose facts evidencing
a positive belief that contraband drugs are on the premises to be
searched, and that they are of such a nature that they can be easily dis-
posed of or destroyed. While this test would clearly remedy many of
the ambiguities which the critics have found inherent in the provision,
it would impose a much heavier burden upon officers seeking no-knock
authority. Additionally, it would compel the judiciary to determine
just what standards apply to "positivity" versus "probable cause," -a
question which has been consistently avoided in nighttime warrant
cases. 1 r While a compromise, this alternate approach is neither neces-
sary nor recommended in the light of existing law.136
Critics also assert that the proposed no-knock provision was of
doubtful constitutional validity. Such contentions are based upon the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures and the implied right of individual privacy. 37
Taken in a broad context, the right of privacy is the right of an
individual to be left alone, shielded from unwarranted governmental
intrusions.13s However, in the words of Mr. Justice Stewart,
the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general con-
stitutional "right to privacy." That amendment protects individual
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its
protection goes further, and often has nothing to do with privacy
at all.139
Some critics of the no-knock provision would find implicit in the right
of privacy the requirement of advanced notice prior to any lawful gov-
ernmental intrusion, such as the execution of a valid search warrant.
However, the dimensions of an individual's right to privacy severely
contract when one is dealing with the execution of a search warrant. For
purposes of conducting a search, the officers authorized to execute the
warrant are legally entitled to entry into the designated premises, with
or without the consent of the occupant. Should an occupant refuse ad-
tion of search warrants relating to offenses involving narcotic drugs at any time of the
day or night is permitted provided there is probable cause to believe that grounds for
the warrant exist. This same exception has been incorporated into section 702(a) of the
proposed Controlled Dangerous Substances Act.
35 Distefano v. United States, 58 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1932); United States v. Castle,
213 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1962).
130 This is espedally true in view of the "will be easily and quickly destroyed"
language now engrafted upon section 702(b). The question of evidence required by the
language closely approaches the standard applied under the positivity approach.
137 S. R . No. 613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1969).
138 United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1968).
189 Id. at 349.
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mission to the premises, the officers are also empowered to use the
necessary force to gain entry.140
When the framers of the Constitution made provisions for the
issuance and execution of search warrants, they recognized that there
would be instances in which an individual would have to be deprived
of his substantive right to privacy. In order to protect the individual
when this event should arise, the framers required the element of
reasonableness in the conducting of any search. Hence, what is really
meant by referring to the general rule requiring notice of authority
and purpose prior to execution of a search warrant is a standard of
reasonableness -a balancing of probable cause, need and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy. Reasonableness is not an equivalent for "right
to privacy," the latter being a part of the former and weighed, with
other factors, to determine proper legal equilibrium.
The no-knock provision, requiring court authorization to dispense
with an announcement, reasserts the general principle that reasonable-
ness of a search demands notice of authority and purpose. It is also a
codification of some exceptions to the general rule.1 41 In effect, it is a
congressional declaration that under certain, specified circumstances,
notice of authority and purpose can be dispensed with and the search
will still remain within the bounds of reasonableness.
Relying upon past experience with narcotic and dangerous drug
law enforcement, Congress could rationally justify these two exceptions
as being necessary for effective law enforcement. It is merely asserting
that under circumstances where prior notice would lead to destruction
of evidence or would endanger the lives of the officers executing the
warrant, an unannounced or forcible entry will not invalidate the search
as unreasonable.
It should be emphasized that the provision does not compel Con-
gress to impose a loose standard. Rather, while Congress will make a
general finding that notice of authority and purpose can lead to de-
struction of evidence or injury to the officers, the provision requires,
in addition, that a neutral judge or magistrate render a specific finding
of either in each individual case. Before notice of authority and pur-
pose can be dispensed with, the judge or magistrate issuing the war-
rant must be satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that such
grounds exist. He must specifically find probable cause to believe
140 Butler v. United States, 275 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
141 Under the proposed no-knock provisions, the only times unannounced entries
will be permitted are when knocking and announcing authority and purpose would either
lead to the quick destruction of the evidence sought or where the officers executing the
warrant are placed in danger of physical harm.
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either destruction of the evidence or injury to the agents will result
if notice of authority and purpose are given. Probable cause requires
more than mere generalities; rather, it requires specific facts. A no-
knock warrant under the proposed provision cannot be issued solely
on the basis that most drug traffickers keep their supply of drugs in a
place where they can be easily disposed of. More specificity is required
by the definition of probable cause. Information relating to the actual
location of the drugs or the propensity of the suspect to be violent will
have to be known by the agents and made available to the judge when
application for the warrant is made.
CONCLUSION
Having traced the historical background, state and federal legis-
lation and case law regarding the requirement of announcing authority
and purpose prior to entering a person's dwelling, the question settles
down to a moral, rather than legalistic, judgment as to whether no-
knock should be permitted. Weighing values of privacy, potential for
violence and the need to preserve evidence in drug cases, it would
seem that no-knock authority is not only necessary but desirable within
the framework of the federal drug proposal. Since the proposed Act
sets out the statutory requirements rather than placing reliance on
common-law doctrines, 142 it would provide law enforcement agencies a
source on which to rely in this area. Furthermore, the bill requires
the interposition of a judge or magistrate before no-knock authority
can be obtained in executing a warrant. This judicial supervision has
been repeatedly favored by the Supreme Court and should be required
in this instant situation. 14
3
What is needed is meaningful reaction, not rationalization. Only
then will the fourth amendment be upheld and the populace pro-
tected.
142 Note that in many states, federal officers are also considered state peace officers
and can execute state laws under state procedures, e.g., California.
143 Sibron v. United States, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347
(1968); McDonald v. United States, 325 U.S. 451 (1948).
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APPENDIXf
STATES REQUIRING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUTHORiTY AND PURPOSE BEFORE FORCED ENTRY
TO EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANTS OR ARRESTS (WrrH OR WrrHOUT A WARRANr)
Arrests
State Search Warrant (with or without warrant)
Alabama Notice Required Notice Required
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 108 (1958).
No-Knock Permitted
ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.040 (1962).
Notice Required*
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1446(B)
(1956).
ALA. CODE tit. 15, §§ 153, 155
(1958).
Notice Required
ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.100 (1962).
Notice Required
AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411
(1956).
0 State v. Mendoza, 454 P.2d 140 (1968) (allowing "No-Knock" for
destruction exception).
No Statute-Common Law
Applies
Notice Required
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-414 (1964).
Notice Required* Notice Required*
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West
Supp. 1969). Supp. 1969).
0 People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 204 P.2d 6 (1956); People v.
Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706 (1967); People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d
299, 437 P.2d 489 (1968) (allows No-Knock for destruction exception).
No Statute-Common Law
Applies
No Statute-Common Law
Applieso
No Statute-Common Law
Applies
No Statute-Common Law
Applies
0 State v. Marino, 152 Conn. 85, 203 A.2d 305 (1964) (allows No-
Knock for destruction exception to common-law announcement rule).
No Statute-Common Law
Appliesc
No Statute-Common Law
Applies
0 Dyton v. State, 250 A.2d 383 (1969) (allows No-Knock for destruc-
tion exception to common-law announcement rule).
Notice Required No Provision-Common Law
D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-129(g) (1967) Applies
(liquor).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-414(g) (1967)
(narcotics).
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (Supp. IV, 1969).
But an annotation to D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-301(6) (1967) states that for
search or arrest that the police can break in after an announcement of
identity and purpose. There are no exceptions. "Breaking and entering
premises without an announcement is clearly illegal and an improper
entry renders a subsequent search invalid."
t The citations listed in the following appendix are illustrative only and in no way are
to be considered all-inclusive.
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
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Arrests
State Search Warrant (with or without warrant)
Florida Notice Reouired* Notice Required
FIA. STAT. § 933.09 (1967). FLA. STAT. § 901.19 (1967).
Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (1964) (allows No-Knock for
destruction exception).
Notice Required
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-308 (1969).
No-Knock Permitted only with
warrant
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-205 (1969).
The arrest provision states that the police may use force to break into a
building and does not require any announcements prior to the breaking.
The new search statute does require an announcement before breaking.
No-Knock Permitted if door to
house is open. Notice required if
door is dosed.
HAWAn Rxv. LAws tit. 37, § 708.37
(1968).
Notice Required
HAwAI REv. LAws tit. 37, § 708.11
(1968).
Notice Required Notice Required
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4409 (1948). IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-611 (1948).
No-Knock Permitted
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-8
(Smith-Hurd 1964).
No-Knock Permitted
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-5(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1964).
The arrest statute states that no notice or announcement required for
arrest but People v. Barbee, 35 III. 2d 407, 220 N.E.2d 401 (1966) re-
quires announcement before arrest. The search warrant section con-
dudes that notice is not necessary if constitutional standards (of reason-
ableness) are met. See also People v. Macias, 39 Ill. 2d 208, 234 N.E.2d
783 (1968); People v. Hartfield, 94 I1l. App. 2d 421, 237 N.E.2d 193 (1968)
(allowing No-Knock for destruction exception).
No Statute-Common Law
applies*
Notice Required
IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1009 (1956).
Hadley v. State, 238 N.E.2d 888, 906 (1968) (allows No-Knock for
destruction exception to the common-law rule of announcement).
Notice Required
IOWA CODE ANN. § 755.9 (1966).
No Statute-Common Law
applies
No Statute--Common Law
applies
No-Knock Permitted
LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 164
(West 1967).
Notice Required
IOWA CODE ANN. § 751.9 (1966).
Notice Required
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1819 (1964).
Notice Required
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 70.077, 70.078
(1969).
Notice Required
LA. CRim. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 224
(West 1967).
The new statute on arrests without warrants is broader now and not
limited only to felonies.
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Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
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Arrests
State Search Warrant (with or without warrant)
Maine No Statute-Common Law No Statute-Common Law
applies* applies'
' State v. Martelle, 252 A.2d 316 (1969) (allows No-Knock as an
exception to the common-law rule of announcement. "An officer .. .
is bound, on demand to make known his authority, but his omission to
do so can do no more than deprive him of the protection which the
law throws around its ministers, when in the rightful discharge of their
duty.').
No Statute-Common Law
applies*
No Statute-Common Law
applies*
' Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1969); Waugh v.
State, 3 Md. App. 379, 239 A.2d 596 (1968) (allowing destruction excep-
tion to the common-law rule of announcement).
Massachusetts No Statute-Common Law
applies*
No Statute-Common Law
applies*
* Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 211 N.E.2d 658, 665 (1965) (Court
referred to No-Knock for destruction exception to the common-law rule
of announcement in dictum.)
Notice Required
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1259(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1970).
Notice Required
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.880 (Cum.
Supp. 1970).
The search provision had not been included previously.
No Statute--Common Law Notice Required
applies* MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 639.33, 639.34
(1965).
*State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 166 N.W.2d 347 (1969).
No Statute-Common Law
applies
No-Knock Permitted
Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.390 (1959).
No-Knock Permitted'
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-709
(1969).
Notice Required
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2472 (1957).
Notice Required
Mo. REV. STAT. § 544.200 (1959).
Notice Required'
MONT. RFv. CODES ANN. § 95-901
(1969).
' The general arrest statute and the search statute give the right to
break in without the requirement of notice. The arrest with or without
warrant statutes require notice unless notice would jeopardize the
arrest.
No-Knock Permitted* No-Knock Permitted'
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-411 (1965). NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (1965).
* "Warrants: execution; powers of officer; direction for executing.
In executing a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with an
offense, or a search warrant, or when authorized to make an arrest for a
felony without a warrant, the officer may break open any outer or inner
door or window of a dwelling house or other building, if, after notice
of his office and purpose, he is refused admittance; or without giving
notice of his authority and purpose, if the judge or magistrate issuing
search warrant has inserted a direction therein that the officer executing
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
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Arrests
State Search Warrant (with or without warrant)
it shall not be required to give such notice, but the political subdivision
from which such officer is elected or appointed shall be liable for all
damages to the property in gaining admission. The judge or magistrate
may so direct only upon proof under oath, to his satisfaction that the
property sought may be easily or quickly destroyed or disposed of, or
that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, if
such notice be given; but this section is not intended to authorize any
officer executing a search warrant to enter any house or building not
described in the warrant."
Nevada
New Hampshire
Notice Required
Nzv. REv. STAT. § 179.090 (1967).
No Statute-Common Law
applies
Notice Required
NEv. R.v. STAT. § 171.138 (1967).
No Statute-Common Law
applies
No Statute-Common Law No Statute-Common Law
applies* applies*
* State v. Juliano, 97 N.J. Super. 25, 234 A.2d 236 (1967) (allows No-
Knock for destruction exception to common-law rule of announcement).
New Mexico No Statute-Common Law
applies
No-Knock Permitted*
N.Y. CODE CRIu,. PROC. § 799
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
No Statute-Common Law
applies
Notice Required
N.Y. CODE CRM. PROC. §§ 175
(arrest with warrant), 178 (arrest
without warrant) (McKinney Supp.
1969).
0 "The officer may break open an outer or inner door or window
of a building, or any part of the building, or anything therein, to
execute the warrant, (a) if, after notice of his authority and purpose,
he be refused admittance, or (b) without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the judge, justice, or magistrate issuing the warrant has
inserted a direction therein that the officer executing it shall not be
required to give such notice. The judge, justice, or magistrate may so
direct only upon proof under oath, to his satisfaction, that the property
sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that
danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may result, if such
notice were to be given."
North Carolina
North Dakota
No Statute-Common Law
applies
No-Knock Permitted if judge so
provides
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29.1-01
(Supp. 1969).
Notice Required
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A4 (Cum.
Supp. 1969).
Notice Required
ND. CENT. CODE § 29-06-14 (1960).
Notice Required* Notice Required
OHIO REv. CODE § 2935.12 Ohio REV. CODE § 2935.12
(Anderson 1967). (Anderson 1967).
* United States v. Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166 (N.D. Ohio 1966) and
State v. Johnson, 16 Ohio Misc. 278, 240 N.E.2d 574 (1968) (allowing
No-Knock for destruction exception).
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
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Arrests
(with or without
State Search Warrant warrant)
Oklahoma Notice Required Notice Required
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1228
(Supp. 1969).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 194
(arrest with warrant), 197 (arrest
without warrant) (Supp. 1969).
Notice Required* Notice Required
ORE. R V. STAT. § 141.110 (Supp. ORE. Rv. STAT. §§ 133.290 (arrest
1969). with warrant), 133.320 (arrest
without warrant) (Supp. 1969).
State v. Cortman, 466 P.2d 681, 683 (1968) (allows No-Knock foi
destruction exception).
Pennsylvania No Statute-Common Law
applies*
No Statute-Common Law
applies.
* United States ex rel. Manduchi v. Tracy, 850 F.2d 658 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965) (allowed No-Knock for destruction
exception to common-law rule of announcement).
Rhode Island No Statute-Common Law
applies*
No Statute-Common Law
applies.
* State v. Johnson, 230 A.2d 831 (1967) (allows No-Knock for de-
struction exception to common-law rule of announcement).
South Carolina
South Dakota
No-Knock Permitted
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-257 (1962).
No-Knock Permitted
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § IIC2
(1970).
Notice Required
S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-198 (1962).
Notice Required
S.D. Comsp. LAws ANN. § 23-22-19
(1967).
Notice Required Notice Required
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.509 (1955). TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.807 (1955).
No-Knock Permitted Notice Required
TEx. CODE Cvum. PRoc. art. 18.18 TEx. CODE CRIM. Paoc. art. 15.25
(1966). (1966).
No-Knock Permitted*
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-54-9 (Supp.
1969).
Notice Required
UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, § 77-13-12
(Supp. 1969).
* 1967 Amendment to search warrant provisions reads:
"Officer may break door or window to execute warrant-Authority. The
officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house,
or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant:
(1) If, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the judge,
justice, or magistrate issuing the warrant has inserted a direction
therein that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such
notice. The judge, justice, or magistrate may so direct only upon proof
under oath, to his satisfaction, that the property sought is a narcotic,
illegal drug, or other similar substance which may be easily and
quickly destroyed or disposed of, or that danger to the life or limb of
the officer or any other may result, if such notice were to be given."
See also State v. Louden, 15 Utah 2d 64, 887 P.2d 240 (1968).
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
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Arrests
(with or without
State Search Warrant warrant)
Vermont No-Knock Permitted No-Knock Permitted
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 802 (1967). VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 302 (1967).
Virginia No Statute-Common Law No Statute-Common Law
applies applies
Washington No Statute-Common Law Notice Required*
applies* WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.31.040
(Supp. 1969).
State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 455 P.2d 595 (1969) (allows No-
Knock for destruction exception).
West Virginia No-Knock Permitted for struc- No Statute-Common Law
tures other than a "dwelling" applies
V. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1A-5
(1966).
Wisconsin No Statute-Common Law No Statute-Common Law
applies applies
Wyoming Notice Required Notice Required for arrest with
warrant
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-165 (1959).
No statute for arrest without war-
rant--Common Law applies
warrant
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-165 (1959).
No statute forar es  without r-
rnt--ommon 
Law appies
